Trump And Kim Get All The Focus, But Moon Jae-in Is Driving The Process

There is no doubt that the meeting between the North and South Korean leaders yesterday represents something historic and a real opportunity for permanently reshaping relations on the Korean peninsula. But it is fascinating to see the American media obsessively focus on the interaction between the alpha males Trump and Kim Jong-un with an occasional mention of China, while the man largely responsible for most of the progress, South Korean President Moon Jae-in, is almost consistently ignored.

Moon won election on a platform of restoring the “Sunshine Policy” to improve relations with the North as well as with China. Moon also promised to re-open the Kaesong Industrial Complex which is a located in the North but allows South Korean companies to use North Korean labor. South Korea shut that complex down in early 2016 after North Korean missile tests.

It was Moon’s efforts that brought the North Koreans to the Olympics and it was largely Moon’s efforts that allowed the Trump-Kim summit became a possibility. Yes, tightening the sanctions and, probably to a far lesser degree, Trump’s militaristic bluster helped push this process a long. Counterintuitively, however, Trump’s aggressive rhetoric worried the South Koreans, making it both easier and more imperative for Moon to begin negotiations with the North. For his part, Kim, having reached a certain nuclear capability, clearly felt comfortable enough to begin negotiations and that he had a willing partner in Moon.

We have been here before. The late 1990s saw the creation of the South’s “Sunshine Policy” under Kim Dae-jung. The difference between now and then is that the incoming Bush administration was adamantly opposed to the policy as part of its hard-line stance against the North that included sabotaging the nuclear agreement made under the Clinton administration. Today, Moon has been able to flatter Trump, giving him large doses of credit for moving the negotiations along, negotiations largely driven by Moon.

So far, this strategy of praising Trump has kept the US from interfering in the North-South negotiations. Reportedly, the Chinese are also providing their tacit support to these negotiations. Both Kim and the Chinese have an interest in weakening the ties between the US and South Korea, while Moon has his own interest of strengthening ties with both. This leaves the US more and more on the outside.

The rubber will meet the road when Kim and Trump meet. If, as it appears possible or even likely, Kim officially ends the Korean War and offers to truly denuclearize the North as well as dismantle its missile program in return for the withdrawal of US forces from the South, how will the US respond? Will Trump declare victory if the offer is somewhat less than that, perhaps with the North keeping some missile capability? Or if Kim and Moon agree the North will somewhat reduce its nuclear arsenal and agree to never engage in a first strike? And how will the hardliners in and out of this administration react to such outcomes?

Any one of those outcomes arguably leaves the US in a weaker position in the region and redounds to China’s benefit. Any significant reduction in US forces in South Korea, much less total withdrawal, will send an alarming signal to Japan and leave them feeling isolated and unsure of America’s commitment to their defense. That, too, will eventually benefit China as the political reality that Japan must too improve their relations with the Chinese sets in.

Now, there is a real case to be made that these outcomes might be for the best. America today may be unwilling or unable to sustain its world-wide imperialistic posture and withdrawing from certain regions may be appropriate. That certainly was part of Trump’s campaign promises and popularity. But no one really believes that all these issues have been thoroughly thought out or vetted by this administration. For Trump, it will just be another winning negotiation. The question will remain who exactly it is a win for.