Confusing Moves Indicate Fissures In Iranian Leadership
I am not expert on Iranian internal politics but it does seem like there must be some kind of internal battle going on within the government. I think we all knew that the nuclear deal with the US would create some friction within the Iranian government, but I’m not sure we expected the disarray to be this visible. First, there was the debacle with allowing Russia to use Iran as a base for attacks in Syria. Initially, Iran allowed Russia to use the Iranian Shahid Nojeh Air Base to refuel its bombers for attacks in Syria. A week later, the Iranians announced that the Russian use of the base was “finished, for now.” Initial reports indicated that the Iranians were angry at Russia for publicly announcing the fact they were using the Iranian base and that was the reason for ending Russian use of the base. But in this day and age of sophisticated monitoring and satellites, it is inconceivable that Iran could think that this would not come out publicly very soon – the US probably knew what was going on as it was happening. Within Iran, there had been some pushback to the use of the base within Parliament, with some members pointing out that allowing a foreign base within the country violated the Iranian constitution. But you have to wonder if the internal dissension over this move was more complicated than that.
Then, earlier this week, a member of the Iranian delegation responsible for negotiating the nuclear deal was arrested and charged with spying. A prosecutor in Teheran earlier announced the arrest of a dual national for spying for Britain. An Iranian judiciary spokesman subsequently answered a question about this arrest of a dual national by calling him a “spy who had infiltrated the nuclear team”. It is unclear but probable that the two announcements refer to the same person. This could be payback by the hardliners within the regime who opposed the nuclear deal. But I think it also indicates some of the fissures within the regime that this could happen.
More disturbing for the regime may be the fact that the economy is still mired in the doldrums. It had been expected that the economy would take off when the sanctions against Iran were lifted last year. But prices of essential goods have continued to rise and the expected foreign investment has yet to materialize. The hardliners place the blame on the US for not fulfilling their end of the deal and the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has backed away from the deal he once supported, saying the nuclear deal has had “no concrete or distinct impact on people’s lives”. Yet, in parliamentary elections earlier this year, moderate candidates made a strong showing and the middle class largely still supports moderate President Hassan Rouhani and are disgusted by the corruption at the highest levels of government. But even Rouhani is feeling the heat from the hardliners, recently accusing the US of not implementing the nuclear deal in good faith. All this is a prelude to next June’s election when Rouhani will probably stand for re-election. If the economy does not improve, you can expect the hardliners to regain control. But the internal battle between now and then may be reflected in some confusing moves by the government as each side jockeys for position.